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The vastmajority of theworld's poor live in rural areas of developing
countries. There they endure long periods of time between inputs into
and outputs from agricultural production, uncertainty about harvest
outcomes, and dependency on the weather. This makes it crucial that
they are able to smooth consumption, to access credit and to employ
strategies for coping with risk (Conning and Udry, 2007). However,
the history of rural ﬁnancial intermediation is not encouraging,
and even the explosive global growth in microﬁnance has beenDanChurchAid and Livingstonia
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. This is an open access article underconcentrated in urban and semi-urban areas (Allen and Panetta, 2010;
Daley-Harris, 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper, 2012).
When formal ﬁnancial institutions are not available, households rely
insteadon networks,moneylenders and informal ﬁnancialmechanisms,
which exist in amyriad of forms (Collins et al., 2009; Rutherford, 2001).
Some of the most well-known are perhaps ROSCAs (rotating savings
and credit associations) (Besley et al., 1994).1 In its simplest form,
members contribute to a common pot of money that is awarded to
a different member at each meeting. Apart from the ﬁrst and last
members, each member will be both a saver and a borrower in the
course of a cycle (Anderson and Baland, 2002; Besley et al., 1994;
Bouman, 1995; Klonner, 2008). Village Savings and Loan Associations
(VSLAs) – a type of local ﬁnancial institution that has been standardized
by CARE and is increasingly being promoted by a host of different orga-
nizations – takemany of the elements of ROSCAs and addmore ﬂexibil-
ity in savings and loans, standardize the governance structure and
reinforce accountability elements. Each VSLA relies on its members'1 Other examples are ASCAs (accumulating savings and credit associations), and Susu-
collectors originating from Ghana (‘Susu’ meaning ‘small small’ in the Akan language in
Ghana).
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
5 The USAID Poverty Assessment Tool, usually abbreviated as PAT, is a list of twenty
simple indicators that are chosen so as to measure poverty in expenditure as accurately
as possible around the 1.25 USD a day poverty lines (see USAID, 2009 and www.
povertytools.org/countries/Malawi/Malawi.html). Indicators included in the PAT for
Malawi are chosen based on the ability to predict household poverty by predicting house-
hold expenditure using the Second Integrated Household Survey (a survey in the World
Bank's Living Standards' Measurement Surveys series). The indicators include household
member characteristics (the age and marital status of the household head, the size of
the household, literacy and educational level of household members), household charac-
teristics (the number of rooms, the type of ﬂoor, the type of toilet facility as well as elec-
tricity in the household), assets (ownership of bed, iron, radio, and bicycle respectively as
well as raising or owning livestock in general and goats in particular) as well as other in-
dicators (whether the household purchased any soap in the past month and whether the
household grows a vegetable garden). The typical use of the tool is to measure average
poverty status in a population. The calculation of poverty status involves as a ﬁrst step
predicting expenditure levels. We use the estimated expenditure levels directly, noting
that the predictions are most accurate around the 1.25 USD poor/non-poor cutoff. Since
the average (predicted) level of expenditures at baseline is around 1.17 USD per person
per day, the prediction is likely to be reasonable good. While there is considerable docu-
mentation on how good PAT is at measuring expenditure-based assessments of poverty,
as of now, there is no evidence on how good it is at measuring changes. It is likely that the
measurement error introduced by the prediction would reduce the power to detect effects.
6 Annan et al. (2013) document substantial effects of the VSLA program, though they
note that their outcomes are mostly based on self-reports.
7 By reducing the risk involved in savings, the not quite “risk-free” but lowest-risk
option can also enable households to adjust their portfolio of activities and undertake
more risky investments elsewhere, for example in businesses or agriculture.
8 As such, this is quite different from amicro-ﬁnance institution expanding access in vil-
lages and providing new resources for credit, as studied in Fulford (2013). He ﬁnds that
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fundwhich can be accessed in times of funerals or illnesses of household
members). A minimum level of savings is compulsory at the weekly
meetings. Typically once a month loans are made available to members
from the VSLAs, and a stated aim of many VSLA projects is to encourage
small businesses. VSLAs thus create a local ﬁnancial market that allo-
cates local savings to debtors who are group members. Moreover,
VSLAs implement a number of accountability and governance features
that are described in more detail below. These features lead to low
cases of default or elite capture.
Once a year, all the savings and the accumulated interest are paid out.
In our context, rural Malawi, a large number of groups plan this “share-
out” just before the agricultural planting season, when seeds and fertil-
izer are bought. This also coincides with the beginning of the school
yearwhen education related expenses are high. There are few formal al-
ternatives for saving and receiving credit in the villageswe are studying:
at baseline only 0.6% of households are participants in a formal micro-
ﬁnance institution, and 5 to 6% in a VSLA group for example.
VSLAs have nowbeen introduced in 72 countries andhave 11million
active participants worldwide.2 However, despite this wide distribution
and the increasing popularity among donors as a means of improving
the ﬁnancial infrastructure in remote rural areas, very little is
known about the impact of VSLAs on household welfare. Unlike other
types of microﬁnance for which several randomized impact studies
have been made showing limited effects (see Banerjee (2013) for a
review of microﬁnance, and Banerjee et al. (2015c) for a review of
microcredit), rigorous impact evaluations of VSLAs that address endog-
enous program placement and selection bias have only recently been
completed.3
We provide a rigorous impact assessment of VSLAs on pre-deﬁned
household outcomes. We do this through a cluster randomized control
trial carried out in forty-six villages in northern Malawi. Among these
forty-six villages, twenty-three villages were randomly selected to par-
ticipate in a VSLA project implemented by a local NGO, Soldev, from
2009 onwards. The remaining twenty-three villageswere used as a con-
trol group, before the project was ﬁnally extended to them in 2011.We
conducted household surveys of 1775 households in 2009, just before
the project was implemented in the treatment villages, and again in
2011, just before the interventionwas introduced in the control villages.
We carefully tracked households that moved between the 2009 and
2011 surveys, resulting in a low attrition rate of only 3%. By 2011, 45%
of the households in treatment villages had joined VSLAs, while almost
21% of households in control villages had also joined. Despite the
implementing NGO adhering strictly to the randomization design,
there was spontaneous spill-over into control villages — typically
because control village inhabitants decided to join VSLA groups in treat-
ment villages.
We assess the impact of introducing VSLAs at village level on seven
general indicators of household welfare. These were pre-deﬁned as
targets by the implementing partner as part of the project design. We
operationalize the seven indicators by one or two outcome variables
each (see Table 2) leading to a total of nine ﬁnal outcome variables.
We also provide multiple hypothesis corrected p-values (denoted by q
in the following).
We ﬁnd evidence of positive impacts on four out of nine outcome
variables. Food security was improved in that the number of meals con-
sumed per day increased by 0.13 (s.e. = 0.05, p = 0.02, q = 0.09)4,2 Based on information on thewebsitewww.vsla.net,maintained byVSL Associates, an or-
ganization that provides training in setting up VSLAs (site accessed on September 9th 2015).
3 We know of a number of project reports that report on VSLA interventions. Three of the-
se use randomized control trials. Annan et al. (2013) is an evaluation report on a study of
VSLAs in Burundi; Beaman et al. (2014) study VSLAs in Mali. A larger international study
covers Ghana, Malawi and Uganda, but at the time of writing, is not yet available for citation.
4 We present the multiple-hypothesis corrected equivalent of p-values, the sharpened q-
values (Anderson, 2008; Benjamini et al., 2006) alongside the p-values. See themethodology
section below.corresponding to one more meal per week. Households were found to
hold larger savings in total (p = 0.02, q = 0.07). Increases in house-
holds' scores on the USAID's Poverty Assessment Tool (PAT)5 suggest
that expenditures increased by about 4.2% (s.e. = 0.02, p = 0.05, q =
0.11). Finally, the average number of rooms per dwelling rose by 0.16
(s.e. = 0.06, p = 0.02, q = 0.09). Concurrently, there is some evidence
that the number of income generating activities decreased, which could
be consistent with increased specialization.
Overall, the results provide evidence that VSLAs can improve house-
hold outcomes, even in as short a period as two years,without any injec-
tion of outside capital. The impacts on participating households are
likely to be larger, as our impact estimates are given by the intention-
to-treat estimator, i.e. they are average impacts across both participat-
ing and non-participating households. Furthermore, there has been a
non-negligible degree of spill-over into control villages and we may
therefore be underestimating the actual impact size. The results of pos-
itive impacts are consistent with results in Beaman et al. (2014), who
study VSLA groups in Mali. They also report positive impacts on savings
(in particular livestock) and food security.6
In the literature, there are several suggestions for possible channels
through which improved ﬁnancial intermediation and participation in
savings groups can have a positive impact on the participating house-
holds and local communities. For VSLAs to attract members, they need
to offer higher interest rates or more secure repayments than alterna-
tive forms of savings. This is possible if groups are better at monitoring
loans than individuals are, if groups have stronger enforcementmecha-
nisms than individuals do, or simply because groups pool the risk on in-
dividual loans (Diamond, 1984).7 In turn, the larger pool of savings
coupled with better loan monitoring (and presumably lower interest
rates on loans than those offered by money-lenders) expands access
to credit within each VSLA, though only to the extent that savings
have accumulated.8’9 If households are constrained in their access towhen household have precautionary saving motives and gain access to credit, there can
be an initial consumption boom at the expense of precautionary savings. In VSLAs, this
cannot be true on average.
9 In addition, VSLAs typically offer a simple and small insurance component. The groups
themselves decide on the exact nature of the insurance, but it almost always involves in-
surance against the illness or death of householdmembers. That is, the insurancemight be
an additional device for coping with risk that can encourage households to discard inefﬁ-
cient ex-ante coping strategies, such as low risk/low return activities. If households choose
activities involving a higher level of risk but higher expected returns, this can lead to in-
creased consumption in the long run even if the insurance itself never has to pay out
(Carter and Zimmerman, 2003; Dercon, 1996).
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increases household income.
Furthermore, since VSLAs entail a minimum level of compulsory
savings, participants with time-inconsistent preferences who realize
their self-control problems may use VSLAs as a commitment device
(Ashraf et al., 2006; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Even if participants
do not have time-inconsistent preferences, VSLAs might allow them
to commit the rest of their households in accordance with their own
preferences (Anderson and Baland, 2002; Jackson and Yariv, 2014).10
VSLAs disburse savings once a year, and typically time these share-
outs to coincide with periods when most households need lump sums
for investments in agriculture and education related expenses, facilitat-
ing such commitments.11
Although we do not aim to investigate all of these possible channels
through which the observed impacts may have come about, we do
investigate the impact on economic activities that VSLAs are meant to
enable, i.e. where implementing NGOs think that there are large poten-
tial returns that households do not reap because of credit constraints.
Beyond the increase in total savings, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant increases in
the use of credit, including credit used for investment purposes. Like-
wise, respondents report that they use their savings upon share-out
for investments, primarily in agriculture and business. We follow this
ﬂow ofmoney into agriculture and small-scale businesses, ﬁnding a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant increase in the use of fertilizers for maize. There is
an increase in the value of maize sold, though no increase in maize pro-
duction overall. We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant increase in the total income
fromenterprises. Overall, themain channel throughwhich the observed
positive impacts on consumption seem to occur is through providing
households with ameans to save for investments, with the investments
into businesses paying off.
2. The intervention and research design
2.1. The VSLA intervention
The VSLA intervention encourages the formation of savings groups
with typically ﬁfteen to twenty-ﬁve members each, and trains each
group in the management of their own village savings and loan associ-
ation. As no external capital is provided, the groups are essentially self-
managed ﬁnancial intermediaries.
Within the larger microﬁnance sector, community-managed
microﬁnance belongs to the category of member-based, community-
managed, accumulatingmicroﬁnance institutions (see Table 1). Typical-
ly, microﬁnance impact evaluations have focused on professionally-
managed microﬁnance institutions. Unlike such institutions, VSLAs do
not depend on the injection of external funds, just as they donot depend
upon the sustainability of a professionally-managed institution, but
rather on the sustainability of the group formed within the local
community.
The inspiration for VSLAs came from rotating savings and credit
associations (ROSCAs) and was developed by CARE international and
VSL Associates during the 1990s (Ashe, 2002). The aim was to improve10 Indeed, Jackson and Yariv (2014) show that, evenwhen an individual's preferences are
not time- inconsistent, all households will exhibit time-inconsistent preferences, unless
discount rates are equal across household members or decisions are dictatorial (i.e. one
household member's preferences decide). Cultural norms would suggest that this would
usually be the husband's preferences,whichmight be another reason formost VSLAmem-
bers being women.
11 If, for example, the share-out is at the beginning of the agricultural season, investment
in agriculture might increase. Duﬂo et al. (2011) ﬁnd that providing farmers with an
opportunity to pay for fertilizer just after the harvest, whenmoney is available, and having
it delivered at the time of planting, increases fertilizer use dramatically. In addition, the
timing of the share-out might serve as a “label”, ﬁxing the minds of the participants on
using the money from the share-out on a particular asset— in this case, fertilizer or other
lump-sum investments in agriculture (Thaler, 1990). These increased investments in, for
example, agriculture can increase productivity and in turn lead to higher household in-
come and an increase in household welfare.on ROSCAs in two respects, namely bymaking the groupsmore sustain-
able and more ﬂexible. Increased sustainability comes from a series of
accountability features that prevent both the theft of funds and elite
capture. Flexibility is increased in thatmembers can at any time borrow
any amount they wish up to three times the level of their own savings,
provided that funds are available. Whereas ROSCAs multiply without
external facilitation, VSLAs only do so to a much lesser extent, and
thus require facilitation by, for instance, an NGO in order to spread rap-
idly. This is perhaps due to the rather complex governance features.
VSLAs are implemented as described in Allen and Staehle (2007).
After conducting awareness meetings in every targeted village, a local
NGO facilitates the formation and training of groups. Participation in
groups is free.12 Initially, groups are visited every week in the ﬁrst
three months to set up the procedures. Groups work as member-
owned ﬁnancial intermediaries with three products: savings, credit
and a smaller insurance component. Savings are compulsory; the
amounts are collected at the weekly meetings and are conceptualized
as buying shares. Every week, a member must buy at least one share
and is permitted to buy up to ﬁve. The share value is set by the group
and written into the group's constitution. It varied between MWK 50
and 100 in the groups in our study.13
Loans are available at every fourthmeeting. If the funds requested by
members exceed the amount of funds saved, the group decideswhowill
be given loans by following a predetermined list of criteria written into
the group's constitution. This typically assigns funds on the basis of the
stated planned use of the loan. The interest rate on loans is set by the
group, and can thus be used to regulate excess supply or excess demand
in themedium term,makingVSLAs lessﬂexible in that regard than “bid-
ding ROSCAs”, which use a process of bidding for loans (Klonner, 2008).
Usually, the nominal interest rate on loans is set at between 5% and 20%
per month, but extensions in repayment schedules and inﬂation make
the real interest rate considerably lower (Rasmussen, 2012). Loan con-
tracts run for three months, with a grace period of one month. Rules
for loan approval are set down in the group's constitution, but often
focus on the requirement that the money be used for productive
(income-generating) uses.
At the end of a cycle, which is around 12 months in duration, all
savings and interest payments are divided by the number of shares
and paid out — the “share-out”. The average value of savings during
the ﬁrst share-out from all groups in the area was 6367 Kwacha (or
69.27 USD PPP-adjusted) which earned an average of 1801 MWK
(19.59 USD PPP) in interest. The interest rate on savings typically
works out at 4% to 5% per month, or about 60% per year (Rasmussen,
2012).14
The actual date of the ﬁnal share-out is set by the group and tends to
be chosen according to when most households need cash. In Malawi,
this is most frequently at the end of the calendar year, when seeds
and fertilizer need to be ﬁnanced, as well as educational materials
purchased. The NGO highlighted the sharing-out at the end of the year
as a beneﬁt from the participation in VSLAs.
At the end of a cycle, members decide whether to leave or remain in
the VSLA group, and whether the group should accept new members.
Any impact found in our analysis below will thus be the impact of at
most two full cycles of collecting savings, distributing loans and
returning the savings with interest among the 100 groups established
by mid-2011. Usually after one year of initial training and monitoring,
groups “graduate”, which means that they cease to be supervised by
the NGO that helped set them up.12 Greaney et al. (2013) provide evidence that charging for participation might lead to
improved outcomes in a similar type of savings group, as instructors have an incentive
to provide better training.
13 Throughout the paper we report monetary values in Malawian Kwacha (MWK). In
2009, 1 USD corresponded to 91.91 MWK using poverty-adjusted PPP exchange rates in
2009.
14 It is lower than the interest on loans primarily due to the facts that not all the funds are
lent out all the time and that savings accumulate over time.
Table 1
Microﬁnance overview.
Ownership Management Fund Accumulation Examples
Member-based
institutions
Professionally-managed
microﬁnance
Large accumulating savings and credit
associations (ASCAs)
FECECAM, Benin
Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOS)
Community-managed
microﬁnance
Rotating savings and credit associations
(ROSCAs)
Tontines, susu, upatu, merry-go-rounds, chit, pasanakus
Small accumulating savings and credit
associations (ASCAs)
Village savings and loan associations, Savings for Change, theWORTHmodel, savings
and internal lending communities
For-proﬁt
institutions
Professionally managed FINADEV, Benin
Equity Bank, Kenya
SKS, India
Non-proﬁt
institutions
Professionally managed Grameen Bank, Bangladesh
BRAC, Bangladesh
Opportunity International
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component, ﬁnanced by a small premium paid by each member each
week separately from the savings and credit activities. The insurance
is paid out as a transfer or an interest-free loan when certain events
occur that are outlined in the constitution, usually the death of family
members, death of cattle, sudden illness, or other emergencies.
A number of governance features guard against theft and elite cap-
ture. With the help of the facilitator, each group develops a constitution
that describes areas of potential conﬂict and their solution, for example
lending rules, election procedures, exclusion of members, and ﬁnes for
delays and non-attendance. To achieve transparency in transactions,
all transactions take place in the presence of all members at the weekly
meetings, and funds are counted independently and in public by two
elected money counters. Between meetings, funds are stored in a
cashbox, locked with three padlocks. Three different members each
hold a key to the box and the box is stored in the house of a fourth, so
that the possibility of collusion for purposes of theft is greatly reduced.
The identity of the “guardian” is kept secret from people outside the
group, providing a degree of protection against theft by outsiders.2.2. The design of the experiment
The crucial challenge for an impact evaluation is to construct a cred-
ible counterfactual that is not sensitive to selection bias, arising typically
due to non-randomprogramplacement and self-selection into program
participation (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2009;
Duﬂo et al., 2007).
We addressed the problem of non-random program placement by
randomizing the roll-out of the VSLA intervention at the village level,
i.e. a cluster randomized control trial. Out of 46 villages in the program
area, we randomly chose 23 villages for implementation in the ﬁrst year
(the treatment villages) and 23 villages for implementation in the third
year (the control villages). To improve the balance in observable and
unobservable characteristics we grouped villages into strata based on
certain characteristics believed to be correlated with central outcomes
of interest (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009).15
The randomization was carried out under our supervision by ﬁeld
ofﬁcers from the NGO, who drew village names from seven hats
containing the villages in each stratum. Fig. 1 below shows the physical
location of the village centers, with the shape of the inner symbol indi-
cating the stratum to which the village belongs, and the outer symbol
indicating allocation to the treatment or control group, respectively
circle and square.15 The non-overlapping strata were deﬁned as follows: large ﬁshing villages, small ﬁsh-
ing villages, particularly eager villages (identiﬁedby theﬁeld ofﬁcers based on the reaction
from villagers at the awareness meetings), large non-ﬁshing villages, villages with a rice
irrigation scheme, villages with another NGO-led intervention, and a ﬁnal group of the re-
maining villages.As part of the VSLA intervention, the implementing partner carried
out awareness meetings in all 46 villages prior to randomization. A
more detailed description of the project introduction activities is
contained in Appendix A. We used these awareness meetings to have
ﬁeld ofﬁcers from the implementing partner collect lists with the
names of the villagers who expressed an interest in joining the VSLA
groups to allow for stratiﬁcation on initial interest. Fig. 2 provides an
overview of the timing of the randomization, the implementation and
the data collection.
The unusual element of asking respondents both in the treatment
and control group whether they were interested was done to increase
power by oversampling respondents more likely to participate since
take-up is often found to be low in microﬁnance projects.16 Appendix
Table A1 shows that the being on the initial list of interested households
does increase the participation probability as expected. However,
households not on this list also had substantial participation rates. In
the control villages, the probability of participation is 15 percentage
points higher for those households on the initial list of interested house-
hold, while in treatment villages being on the list raises participation by
25 percentage points relative to households not on the list of initially
interested households.
There are two major downsides to this design: First, since
oversampling necessitates weighted regressions, a mechanical con-
sequence is that the gains of over-sampling are not as large as one
might think, in particular since participation rates among those not
on the list of interested households turned out to be quite high, between
35 and 40%. Second, asking the control groupwhether they are interest-
ed can alter the behavior of the control group and can lead to ethical
issues unless combined with a roll-out design (i.e. the control group
will eventually also be treated).
As a consequence, the treatment effect could be biased if the control
group alters its behavior in anticipation of later participation in the
treatment.17 In our case, households in control villages may wait to in-
vest in businesses, hoping to get better interest rates on credit once
members of a VSLA; disinvest from their buffer stock savings in the
hope that the insurance mechanism from the group they might join in
the future would cover them; or the initial awareness meetings in all
villagesmay have inspired households from control villages to seek par-
ticipation in VSLA groups in treatment villages. In fact, more than 20% of
households in control villages have become members of a VSLA before
the roll-out into control villages started in 2011, see Table 4. This further
reduces the power that was to be gained from oversampling interested
households. In hindsight, the range of problems the announcement of
the programmight bring, in particular to such a complex topic as ﬁnan-
cial markets, suggests that it should be used with care.16 See for example Banerjee et al. (2015a) for an evaluation of amicroﬁnance project that
led to an increase in microcredit of 8.5%.
17 This is slightly different from the John Henry effect which refers to the control group
trying to prove themselves by over-performing. Here they could also be thought to “un-
der-perform”, by not investing for example.
20
Fig. 1.Map of treatment and control villages in randomization blocks.
Fig. 2. Timeline of intervention and data collection.
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The ﬁnal outcome variables for the primary impact analysis were
closely linked to the development outcomes originally stated by
the implementing NGO in the project's logical framework analysis (LFA)
matrix, inwhich theNGOdescribed the desired and anticipated outcomes
and associated assumptions.18 The matrix shows indicators on which the
intervention is expected to have an impact, but it does not specify exactly
how each of these indicators is to be measured. We select ﬁnal outcome
variables which come close to the original speciﬁcation (see Table 2).19
Although this is not equivalent to having laid out a pre-analysis plan as
suggested by Casey et al. (2012), we follow this strategy to effectively
tie the analysis – and our hands – to these outcome measures.
We do, however, also report extensively on non-predeﬁned out-
comes in order to investigate possible channels of the observed impact.
Below we explicitly distinguish between the predeﬁned primary18 The logical framework matrix is a part of the logical framework analysis (LFA), by far
the most common project management tool used in international development (Dale,
2003). The matrix is made by the implementing partner prior to initiating a project and
speciﬁes the expected impacts of the intervention. Since the matrix is made by practi-
tioners rather than researchers, it is not very detailed when it comes to measurement
and analysis.
19 For a variety of reasons we did not collect information necessary to compute a total
yearly household income measure.analyses following the LFA indicators and the non-predeﬁned second-
ary analyses investigating mechanisms.3. Data and estimation strategy
3.1. Data
To enable oversampling of households which had expressed an
interest in participating in the groups to be formed, we stratiﬁed the
sample within each village by whether the household had declared an
interest in participation, using the information gathered by the NGO
during the awareness meetings. We sampled roughly 38 households
in total in each village.20Due to differences in village size, our procedure led to considerable variation in sam-
pling probability between observations, and we used weighted regressions throughout.
There is no agreement on whether to use sampling weights or not (see Angrist and
Pischke, 2009). If the population regression function is interpreted as causal in all its pa-
rameters, as would be the case in structural equationmodeling, then weighting is in some
cases not justiﬁed, regardless of the underlyingmethod of sampling (Cameron and Trivedi,
2005). If, however, there is only one parameter of interest, for example because the causal
interpretation stems from exogenous variation rather than from a correct structural spec-
iﬁcation,weights should be applied. This is the casewithin a counterfactual framework, or
more speciﬁcally the Rubin causal model (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Rubin, 1974).
Table 2
Predeﬁned outcome measures and corresponding outcomes for the analysis.
Logical framework indicator
(Soldev's choice)
Corresponding ﬁnal outcome
variable (authors' choice)
Hungry period is reduced 1) Number of months in past year
with less than three meals per
day.
Increase in the consumption of food 2) Number of meals previous day.
3) Food consumption per week
per adult equivalent (log)
The average number of IGAs carried out by
the VSLA participants has increased
4) Number of income-generating
activities in each household.
Increase in the volume of savings by the VSLA
groups from project-related activities by
2012
5) Total savings (log)
The share of the targeted population living
below USD 1.25/day has decreased as
measured using USAID's PAT
6) USAID PAT's prediction of per
capita expenditure (log)
HHs have improved their housing standards 7) Number of rooms in dwelling
8) House has cement ﬂoor
Increase in household asset ownership 9) Asset count
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Initiative under the supervision of the authors. In 2009, data collection
took place from July 26 to August 30. The endline data was collected be-
tween July 8 and August 14, 2011. In both the 2009 and 2011 data col-
lection, 24 interviewers completed interviews with up to 1775
households. A sub-sample of 834 households was also interviewed
using a longer questionnaire that went into greater depth, in particular
with respect tomore detailed questions on loans and business activities.
Fig. 1 shows the geographical locations of the villages in which the pro-
ject was implemented surveyed. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, the
treatment villages (marked by circles) and control villages (marked by
squares) are contiguous, which made it possible for some households
from control villages to participate in VSLA groups in the treatment vil-
lages, an issue which we address below.
To limit attrition, we implemented a tracking survey in 2011, with
the result that a total of 1715 households were surveyed in that year.
The attrition between the 2009 and the 2011 survey rounds was only
60 households, or less than 4% of the initial sample, which compares fa-
vorably with other panel surveys (Glewwe and Jacoby, 2000).
Since we also tracked households where one of the designated re-
spondents had moved out due to some reason such as divorce, we
have a number of split households, i.e. instances where one household
from the 2009 survey had become two households in 2011. In the esti-
mations below we drop one of these new households at random to en-
sure a balanced panel. We assess the implications of this for the results
in the robustness section by limiting the sample to intact households.
3.2. Baseline balance
We test whether the randomization of villages into treatment and
control groups did in fact lead to two groups with the same observable
characteristics.
Table 3 below provides descriptive statistics for our ﬁnal outcome
variables and some characteristics of the households for the entire
sample of households in 2009. Men headed 85% of households in the
sample. Household heads on average had just below seven years of
education. Households had an average of just below six household
members eachwho, at the time of the interview, had a level of expendi-
tures of approximately USD 1.17 per person per day (2005 values)
assessed using the USAID PAT measurement,21 and ate fewer than
three meals a day for an average of more than four months of the year.21 Throughout the analysis, we used the 2005 poverty-adjusted purchase power parity
exchange rates suggested by Deaton and Dupriez (2011).Columns four and ﬁve report themean values of the variables for the
households in the treatment villages and control villages respectively.
Column six shows t-values for the differences between treatment
and control villages, indicating whether the differences are statistically
signiﬁcant. These t-values were calculated by implementing an OLS
regression which controls for randomization strata while using sam-
pling weights and clustering at the village level. None of our predeﬁned
outcomes or observable household characteristics are signiﬁcantly
different at a conventional 5% level and the treatment and control sam-
ples appear reasonably balanced. Only the number of income generat-
ing activities is slightly lower in the treatment than in the control
villages, which is signiﬁcant at the 10% level of signiﬁcance. It should
be noted, that total savings were only collected for the subset of house-
holds, which were administered the longer in-depth questionnaire
mentioned above.
3.3. Empirical strategy
The randomization allows for simple estimation strategies to be
used to estimate the treatment effects of introducing VSLAs to villages,
as it ensures that without treatment, the expected outcomes are the
same in the treatment villages and in the control villages. Several differ-
ent estimators can be employed to estimate the intention-to-treat
effect.
We ﬁrst estimate the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect, δDM, i.e. the
average effect of introducing the VSLA intervention for all the house-
holds in the treatment villages compared to all the households in the
control villages, irrespective of whether the households actually partic-
ipated in VSLAs as follows:22
yij ¼ αþ δDMVSLAj þ θBlockj þ εij
where yij is the outcome for household i in village j, VSLAj is a dummy in-
dicating whether village j was assigned to participate in the VSLA pro-
gram, and δDM is the difference-in-means ITT estimate.
We include the randomization strata, termed blocks, in all our linear
regressions, as recommended by Duﬂo et al. (2007). We implement
weighted regressions using the inverse sampling probability as the
weight for each household, and cluster standard errors at the village
level. These sampling weights account for the fact that we over-sampled
interested households.
Our second speciﬁcation includes the lagged value of the dependent
variable.
yij ¼ αþ δDMlagVSLAj þ τyij1 þ θBlockj þ εij
Third, we use the pooled difference-in-differences estimator
(Angrist and Pischke, 2009):
yijt ¼ αþ βVSLAj þ γpostt þ δDiD VSLAj∙postt
 
jt þ θBlockj þ εijt
where postt indicates whether the observation is from the 2011 post-
treatment survey, and (VSLAj ∙postt)jt is the interaction of the two — i.e.
whether the observation is from a treatment village in the 2011 survey.
δDiD is our parameter of interest — the ITT using pooled difference-in-
differences.
Finally, we take out any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at
the household level through ﬁrst-differencing.
Δyij ¼ αþ δFDVSLAj þ Δεijt
δFDgives us the ITT estimate using ﬁrst differences, which is our pre-
ferred estimate for uncensored outcomes.22 Note that because the compliance in control villages was imperfect, this will underes-
timate the impact of VSLAs.
Table 3
Baseline characteristics and balance between treatment and control groups.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable N Mean SD Treatment average Control average Difference (t-value)
Project outcomes
Number of months with fewer than three meals a day 1737 4.10 4.03 4.26 3.92 1.18
Number of meals yesterday 1737 2.65 0.56 2.61 2.70 1.45
17-Food consumption per week per adult equivalent (MK, log) 1737 6.10 0.58 6.07 6.14 1.52
Number of income-generating activities (including agriculture and livestock) 1737 1.99 1.10 1.94 2.04 1.73⁎
Total savings (log) 576 7.87 1.66 7.77 8.00 0.59
Per capita expenditure predicted by USAID PAT (log) 1737 0.16 0.42 0.16 0.16 0.39
Size of house (number of rooms) 1737 2.75 1.25 2.73 2.77 0.37
House has cement ﬂoor 1737 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.09 1.47
Asset count 1737 12.89 7.87 12.84 12.94 0.46
Other household characteristics
Age of household head 1726 38.94 15.34 39.00 38.88 0.15
Household size 1737 5.77 2.46 5.71 5.83 0.68
Household is female-headed 1737 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.14 0.87
Years of education in household 1734 6.87 3.26 7.07 6.65 1.61
Household owns land 1732 0.96 0.19 0.95 0.97 1.48
Household is member of VSLA 1734 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.05 0.66
Notes: Table presents the mean and standard deviation of baseline characteristics in the sample as a whole (columns 2 and 3), as well as the mean separately by treatment status in
columns 4 and 5. Displayed results are on the full sample of 1737 households for which we have information for all pre-deﬁned outcomes. Total savings information was only collected
from the subset of 834 households, which were administered the longer questionnaire. Log (savings) only presented for observations with non-zero savings. Observation numbers are
reducedwhen there ismissing information in a central variable. Column 6 reports the absolute value of the t-statistic from aweighted regression of the dependent variable on an indicator
variable for VSLA and stratiﬁcation ﬁxed effects, testing for baseline difference inmeans between treatment and control villages. Huber–White standard errors clustered at the village level
presented in parentheses. ⁎ p b 0.1.
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We implement tobit regressions for censored variables on a logarith-
mic scale (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). As it is not obvious how to pro-
vide the correct estimate and inference in difference-in-differences and
difference-in-means with lagged variable tobit models, we focus on
difference-in-means models for variables on a logarithmic scale.23
When we investigate impacts on the proﬁtability of businesses, we
implement median regressions for business income, as we have a large
proportion of zeros (suggesting a censored model). However, tobit
regressions are inappropriate as business incomes can be negative. The
OLS estimates are sensitive to outliers, resulting in large standard errors.
The quantile regressions are robust to the large positive and negative
values we observe, and are useful at establishing whether there is any
impact of VSLAs on business income.Treatment villages Control villages
Fig. 3. Cumulative VSLA membership by village category. Notes: This ﬁgure presents the
timing of membership in VSLA in treatment and control villages. Sample observations
are reweighted so that they represent (estimates of) the proportion of households.
Information on the timing of membership is based on survey data.
Table 4
VSLA membership.3.5. Multiple hypothesis testing
When multiple hypotheses are tested, the probability of rejecting
at least one null hypothesis is higher than the signiﬁcance level, even
when a programhas no effect on any of the outcomes (see, for example,
Anderson, 2008). To deal with this issue, a number of techniques have
been developed, the most famous of which is the so-called Bonferroni
correction. Bonferroni's correction is however excessively conserva-
tive, leading to a substantial loss of power. Anderson (2008) provides
an overview and implements a range of methods to correct standard
errors for multiple hypothesis testing, including controlling for the
false discovery rate (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995), a procedure recent-
ly used by Banerjee et al. (2015b). We present the sharpened q-values of
Benjamini et al. (2006) and Anderson (2008) for our main results, see
Appendix B for more detail.23 See Ai and Norton (2003) and Puhani (2012). The Stata program for the ﬁxed effects
tobit estimator based on Honoré (1992) did not converge in our case.4. Results for main outcomes
4.1. Take-up
Before assessing the impact of the intervention, we describe how
successful it was in attracting participants to form VSLAs. Fig. 3 givesControl villages Treatment villages Differences
Baseline (2009) 0.052 0.061 0.010
Endline (2011) 0.207 0.451 0.259⁎⁎⁎
Difference 0.155⁎⁎⁎ 0.390⁎⁎⁎ 0.235⁎⁎
Notes: Standard errors used in calculating signiﬁcance are clustered at the village
level. ⁎⁎ p b 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Table 5
Effects on predeﬁned outcomes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Difference in means Difference in means with lag Difference-in-difference First-difference
Number of months with fewer than three meals a day
−0.203 −0.272 −0.493 −0.555
(0.38) (0.36) (0.45) (0.38)
[0.703] [0.35] [0.303] [0.181]
Number of meals yesterday
0.055 0.069⁎⁎ 0.145⁎⁎ 0.126⁎⁎
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
[0.378] [0.121] [0.252] [0.091]
17-Food consumption per week per adult equivalent (MK, log) 0.026 0.046 0.080 0.097
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
[0.703] [0.326] [0.303] [0.181]
Number of income-generating activities (including agriculture and livestock)
−0.179⁎⁎⁎ −0.144⁎⁎⁎ −0.104 −0.060
(0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.07)
[0.034] [0.063] [0.338] [0.324]
Total savings (log)
1.034⁎⁎
(0.43) n.a. n.a. n.a.
[0.07]
Per capita expenditure predicted by USAID PAT (log) 0.030 0.037⁎ 0.041⁎ 0.042⁎⁎
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.53] [0.121] [0.252] [0.107]
Size of house (number of rooms)
0.104 0.133⁎ 0.135⁎ 0.158⁎⁎
(0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
[0.53] [0.121] [0.252] [0.091]
House has cement ﬂoor
0.019 0.002 0.001 −0.010
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[0.53] [0.61] [0.593] [0.324]
Asset count
−0.643 −0.455 −0.484 −0.374
(0.62) (0.38) (0.42) (0.35)
[0.53] [0.234] [0.303] [0.324]
Notes: Table presents results for the ITT impact of VSLA on predeﬁned outcomes. With the exception of row 5 (total savings) all regressions are weighted least squares regres-
sions. For total savings, weighted tobit regressions are reported, which is why we do not report results in columns (2)–(4). All columns report the estimates from a regression of the
respective predeﬁned outcome on a VSLA treatment assignment dummy and stratiﬁcation ﬁxed effects, accounting for sampling weights. Huber–White standard errors clustered at the
village level are presented in round parentheses. *p b 0.1, **p b 0.05, ***p b 0.01. Multiple hypothesis corrected sharpened q-values (as in Anderson, 2008) in square brackets. Column 1
(simple means) reports estimates where no additional controls are included. Column 2 includes the lagged baseline covariate as dependent variable. Column 3 presents results from
difference-in-differences speciﬁcations, and column 4 includes household-level ﬁxed effects in the speciﬁcation. Sample size as in Table 3.
24 In rawnumbers 71.4% of households hold liquid savings at baseline, at endline this has
increased to 79.3 and 87.5% in control and treatment villages, respectively.
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and in the 2011 survey the levels of membership found were substan-
tially higher in the treatment villages than in the control villages.
Table 4 shows that, at the time of the baseline survey in 2009, 6% of
the population in both the control and the treatment villages reported
that they were members of a VSLA or a similar savings group. Two
years later, the ﬁgure was 20.7% for the control group and 45% for the
treatment group.
This 23.6 percentage point difference in the take-up of the VSLA
intervention between the treatment and control villages is signiﬁcant
at the 1% level, suggesting that the randomization was effective in
inducing more treatment villagers to participate in VSLAs. However,
compliance with the treatment is not perfect, and the randomization
suffers from two-sided non-compliance (Gerber and Green, 2012).
Not all households living in villages assigned to treatment participated,
just as some households from the control villages found their way into
VSLA groups. But as Fig. 3 shows, the timing between treatment and
control villages differs. Until mid-2009 there was a general, but very
small, increase in membership in the area regardless of the random
assignment into treatment and control groups. In 2009, when the inter-
vention commenced, membership took off in the treatment villages. In
the control villages, however, membership seems to have followed the
general pre-project trend until late 2010. This indicates that control
group contamination happened relatively late. However, we cannot
rule out that the estimated results presented below suffer from some
degree of downward bias due to this contamination.
Lønborg and Rasmussen (2014) describe the proﬁle of households
who participate in the VSLAs studied here. They suggest that VSLAs do
reach very poor households (our study area is one of the poorest areas
in one of the poorest countries in the world and so most households
in our study area are very poor), but that in the area studied here, the
very poorest do not participate.4.2. Impact on predeﬁned outcomes
The four columns of Table 5 below present the estimated intention-
to-treat effects of the VSLA intervention using, respectively, difference-
in-means, difference-in-means with lagged value of the dependent
variable, pooled difference-in-differences, and ﬁrst-differenced regres-
sion methods on the predeﬁned outcomes. We ﬁrst discuss the results
using the signiﬁcance levels from individual outcome regressions
as the starting point. We then present the interpretation based on the
multiple hypothesis q-values.
Overall, we ﬁnd that the introduction of VSLAs in the treatment vil-
lages had a signiﬁcant impact on a number of outcome variables over
the two-year intervention period. Food security improved, particularly
in terms of the number ofmeals consumed the day before the interview.
Although the number of income-generating activities decreased, the
total volume of savings increased. Finally, there is some evidence of
increased total expenditures as predicted using PAT aswell as increases
in the size of the dwelling, while we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact
on the length of the hunger period, on food consumption (measured in
terms of the 17 most common food items), on ﬂoor quality or a gross
asset count.
The increase in total savings arises from an increase in the propor-
tion of people who have liquid savings24, but mostly from an increase
in savings amounts among those who already had savings at baseline.
The impact on savings is sizeable and corresponds to an increase in
savings of 153% in addition to the increase in saving experienced in
the control group. Appendix Table A2 shows that there is no evidence
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evidence that there was a positive and signiﬁcant impact on savings
among respondents on the list of interested households in control
villages, an increase which is entirely driven by VSLA members.
There is also no evidence of a decrease in savings among the non-
VSLA members. As such, Appendix Table A2 provides no evidence
to support worries that control villages households postponed savings
while waiting for the VSLA program. Furthermore, when we look into
membership into alternative organizations or groupswithmicroﬁnance
components, we ﬁnd that there is very little crowding out. The intro-
duction of VSLAs in treatment villages reduces membership in village-
based groups (some of which may also have a savings and credit func-
tion) by 3–4 percentage points.25
The difference-in-means estimates of the impact on the number of
income-generating activities are negative across the ﬁrst two speciﬁca-
tions, indicating that households in the treatment villages decreased the
number of such activities. A priori it is unclear which impact to expect
here. The implementing NGO had an aim of increasing the number of
income-generating activities of thehouseholds involved in the program,
but as mentioned in the introduction the fact that a household gains
access to savings, credit and insurance against major unforeseen prob-
lems may lead to more efﬁcient economic choices, in particular to spe-
cialize in a few more proﬁtable income-generating activities rather
than to have a diversiﬁed set of such activities. A decrease in the number
of income-generating activities is consistent with such an explanation,
although we cannot identify this to be the exact channel that accounts
for the change.
In columns (3) and (4) we control for baseline differences between
treatment and control groups by estimating difference-in-differences
regressions taking village-level time-invariant characteristics into
account as well as household-level time-invariant characteristics using
ﬁrst-differencing. The results across these two speciﬁcations are very
stable. First of all, the number of meals consumed the day prior to the
survey signiﬁcantly increased: the households from the treatment
villages consumed on average 0.13–0.15 more meals per day (s.e. =
0.05 and s.e. = 0.07 respectively), which is equivalent to one in seven
households consuming an extra meal. Given that the baseline average
is 2.65 meals per day, this is a sizable impact.26
The effect on the number of meals per day is mirrored in a positive
effect on overall expenditure as predicted by PAT (marginally signiﬁcant
at the 10% level in the difference-in-differences speciﬁcation, and at the
5% level for ﬁrst differences), of about 4.1–4.2% (s.e. = 0.02).
The number of rooms increased by 0.14–0.16 (s.e. = 0.06 and
s.e. = 0.07, respectively), which is statistically signiﬁcant at the
10% level in the difference-in-differences speciﬁcation, and at the
5% level for ﬁrst differences. In rural areas in Malawi, where house-
holds usually live in huts built of mud plastered onto a wooden
frame, it is quite common to build additional rooms onto the existing
structure or in the compound when money allows, or – if possible –
to replace the mud hut with burnt or un-burnt brick structures.27
However, we found no signiﬁcant effects on the type of ﬂoor in the
dwelling.We also found no signiﬁcant effects on total food consump-
tion measured in terms of the 17 most common food items or on the
length of the “hungry” period where households live on less than
three meals per day, though the signs of both of these are consistent
with an increase in food security.25 Results are available upon request from the authors.
26 The impacts on number of meals do not seem to be driven by those households who
share-out close to the date of the survey (Fig. 4).Whenwedrop those households, the im-
pacts on number of meals remain very similar. These results are available upon request
from the authors.
27 Appendix Fig. A1 shows that the changes in the number of rooms are primarily due to
households in the treatment group adding rooms, as opposed to the housing stock in the
control group depreciating.4.3. Robustness
Our results are weaker in terms of statistical signiﬁcance and not ro-
bust across speciﬁcationswhenweuse themultiple hypotheses corrected
standard errors. In the simple means speciﬁcation, the impact on
savings and on the number of income generating activities (remains)
signiﬁcant, though at lower levels of signiﬁcance (5% and 10% levels
respectively). In the difference-in-differences speciﬁcation, not a
single variable is signiﬁcant, while in the ﬁrst difference speciﬁca-
tion, our preferred speciﬁcation for continuous outcomes, the impact
on the number of meals consumed yesterday and the size of the
house are signiﬁcant, though only at the 10% level of signiﬁcance.
The impact on expenditure levels as predicted by PAT is not signiﬁ-
cant at conventional levels of signiﬁcance, with a q-value of 0.11.
Our conclusion from the multiple hypothesis corrected tests of
signiﬁcance is that there is still evidence of VSLAs having a positive
effect on food security, savings and the number of rooms. However,
the evidence is much weakened in its statistical signiﬁcance and in the
lack of robustness across speciﬁcations.
In Table 6, we assess the robustness of the results to dropping split
households, focusing on the estimated intention-to-treat effects. In the
2011 survey, we tracked any households that had moved or split into
multiple households during the survey period. Thus, for a number of
households, deﬁned from the 2009 survey, we had two observations
in the 2011 survey. In the predeﬁned analysis above, we drop one of
each of these split households at random from the 2011 sample. In
Table 6 we drop all split households, i.e. restricting the sample to intact
households. Columns (1) through (4) replicate the speciﬁcations of
Table 5. The point estimates do not change much, and the signiﬁcance
level of all estimates is nearly identical to the previous speciﬁcations.
4.4. Results for intermediate outcomes
In order to investigate possible causal mechanisms for the effects
found, we begin by studying whether the intervention actually im-
proved access to and take-up of the ﬁnancial services offered, namely
savings and credit. We then investigate households' agricultural pro-
duction as well as their business related activities.
4.5. Savings volumes and share-outs
The core component of the VSLA intervention is savings, these being
a prerequisite for subsequent credit opportunities and insurance. We
showed above the estimated ITT effects on total savings volume. In
Table 7 we extend this analysis by looking at the effects on different
types of highly liquid savings.We ﬁnd that the change in overall savings
is driven by changes in savings in VSLAs. We do not observe any signif-
icant changes in the other savings options (non-VSLA savings as a
whole) nor in any of the sub-categories of non-VSLA savings.28
A natural question is where the funds saved in VSLAs come from,
since savings in other categories of savings do not decline. The results
for consumption suggest that the extra savings do also not come from
reduced consumption in terms of meals per day or measured by PAT,
our asset-based expenditure estimate.29 The increased VSLA savings
may be a result of extra income, just as credit may also play a role. The
next sections investigate this further by estimating the impact on credit
and on income from business and agriculture.
Before exploring the use of VSLAs, it is important to note that saving
in the VSLA groups is not identical to saving in a regular liquid savings
account: a core feature of the intervention is the annual share-out of
all savings along with any interest earned from loans made during the28 We do not ﬁnd evidence that VSLAs crowded out ROSCAs. Only 20 households had
been a member of a ROSCA at baseline.
29 Note that these consumption measures are unlikely to capture the more hidden con-
sumption used for instance on alcohol or gambling.
Table 6
Regressions without split households.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Outcome Difference in means
no split household
Difference in means with
lag and no split household
Difference in difference
with no split household
First-differences
without split households
Number of months with fewer than three meals a day −0.204 −0.266 −0.478 −0.541
(0.38) (0.36) (0.45) (0.38)
Number of meals yesterday 0.058 0.071⁎⁎ 0.150⁎⁎ 0.129⁎⁎
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
17-Food consumption per week per adult equivalent (MK, log) 0.023 0.043 0.079 0.094
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Number of income-generating activities (including
agriculture and livestock)
−0.185⁎⁎⁎ −0.151⁎⁎⁎ −0.113 −0.068
(0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.07)
Total savings (log) 1.043⁎⁎ n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.43)
Per capita expenditure predicted by USAID PAT (log) 0.030 0.035⁎ 0.041⁎ 0.040⁎
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Size of house (number of rooms) 0.102 0.133⁎ 0.137⁎ 0.159⁎⁎
(0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
House has cement ﬂoor 0.017 0.001 0.002 −0.010
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Asset count −0.652 −0.475 −0.504 −0.414
(0.63) (0.39) (0.43) (0.36)
Notes: The table presents weighted regressions of predeﬁned outcomes on a treatment dummy, following the same speciﬁcations as in Table 5. The sample excludes all households that
split between baseline and endline. For total savings, weighted tobit regressions are reported, which is why we do not report difference-in-differences and ﬁxed effects results. Huber–
White standard errors clustered at the village level are presented in parentheses. ⁎ p b 0.1, ⁎⁎ p b 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
Table 7
ITT effects on savings outcomes.
(1)
Outcome Difference in means
Total savings (log) 1.034⁎⁎
(0.4304)
VSLA savings (log) 3.480⁎⁎⁎
(0.902)
Non-VSLA savings (log) 0.048
(0.479)
Savings with friend/relative (log) −0.763
(1.681)
Savings at home (log) 0.192
(0.569)
Savings with bank (log) 0.910
(1.761)
Notes: Table presents results for tobit regressions estimating the impact of VSLA on the log
of the value of savings. We implement the suggestion of Cameron and Trivedi (2005) of
setting the cutoff at a very small value below the lowest observed value for zero values.
Columns 1 presents the results from a tobit regression on the VSLA dummy and block
ﬁxed effects. ⁎⁎ p b 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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until the date of the share-out, and thus they also become a commit-
ment device. Among the households participating in VSLAs, more than
30% had received a share-out at the time of the survey in 2011.30
Based on households' self-reports, the funds from the share-outs were
primarily used for agricultural inputs or investments. This corresponds
to the timing of the share-out observed, which was typically during
the planting season when there is a need for seeds and fertilizer (see
Fig. 4).30 From the information recorded by the implementing NGO, only 3 of the 102 groups
that had been initiated by September 2011 had shared out twice, while another 40 groups
had shared out once.4.6. Credit volume
The other key component of the intervention is the use of pooled
savings as credit for the VSLA members.
Table 8 below shows the estimated ITT effects on a range of credit-
related outcomes using the same estimation strategies as in Table 5.
In addition to increasing the likelihood of taking out at least one loan,
living in a treatment village increased the number as well as the value
of loans that had been active within the previous twelve months (total
loan amount). The intervention also increased the take-up of loans for
investment purposes: the probability of having taken a loan for invest-
ment purposes and the number of loans taken for investment purposes
increased, just as the value of loans taken for investment in agriculture
increased signiﬁcantly. The increases are sizeable and generally signiﬁ-
cant. Total loan amounts increased signiﬁcantly and so did the amount
borrowed for agriculture; however there was no signiﬁcant increase in
the amount borrowed for business purposes. If we include all types of
loan, the raw share of households with loans in treatment villages
more than quadrupled from 6% to 26%,31 suggesting that access to and
use of credit increased substantially.
Although the total loan value for agricultural investments increased
considerably more than that for business purposes, more VSLA mem-
bers report to have taken out loans for trading and other business pur-
poses than for agricultural input or investments. Self-reported use of
creditmight verywell bewrong (Karlan et al., 2015) and thus,we inves-
tigate these two potential channels for the effects of VSLAs in the follow-
ing. Speciﬁcally, we look at whether VSLAs seem to have inﬂuenced
agricultural inputs or outputs and whether VSLAs have inﬂuenced
other types of business activities.31 Note that this increase is larger than the ITT estimate by itself, as the proportion of con-
trol households with loans also doubled, possibly because of spill-over of the intervention
into control villages. The proportion of treatment households with any loan at baseline
was 5.9% (8.1% for control households). Between baseline and endline, the control villages
increased the proportion of households with a loan by 6% and the treatment villages by
19.6%. In total at endline, 25.5% of treatment households had a loan. A little more than
50% of the VSLA members took out loans.
32 Appendix Table A3 shows the ITT effects on a range of other agricultural inputs and
outputs, though we do not ﬁnd any consistent effect.
Notes: Dashed vertical line shows median date of endline survey.
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Fig. 4. Timing of share-outs (by treatment status).
Table 8
ITT effects on credit outcomes.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome Baseline mean Difference in means Difference in means with lag Difference-in-difference First-difference
Household had any loan in past 12 months
0.070 0.122⁎⁎⁎ 0.122⁎⁎⁎ 0.129⁎⁎ 0.145⁎⁎⁎
[0.26] (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
Number of loans active within past 12 months
0.074 0.138⁎⁎⁎ 0.138⁎⁎⁎ 0.144⁎⁎ 0.160⁎⁎⁎
[0.28] (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
Total loan amount (log)ᵃ
8.72 2.714⁎⁎⁎ n.a. n.a. n.a.
[1.20] (0.76) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Household took out loan for investment
purposes in past 12 months
0.044 0.096⁎⁎ 0.095⁎⁎ 0.076⁎ 0.082⁎
[0.21] (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Number of investment loans
0.046 0.107⁎⁎⁎ 0.107⁎⁎⁎ 0.086⁎ 0.092⁎⁎
[0.22] (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Total amount borrowed for agricultural
investments (log)ᵃ
9.38 3.507⁎⁎⁎ n.a. n.a. n.a.
[0.85] (1.01) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total amount borrowed for business purposes (log)ᵃ
8.53 1.183 n.a. n.a. n.a.
[1.14] (0.76) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Notes: Table reports estimates of the impact of VSLA on credit outcomes. Column (1) presents the mean of the outcome at baseline, with standard deviations in square brackets. Column
(2) presents the results from the difference in means speciﬁcation, column (3) from the difference in means with lagged value speciﬁcation. Columns (4) and (5) present results from
difference-in-differences andﬁrst differences speciﬁcations, respectively. Rowswithout “a” superscript contain Least squares regressions. Regressionswith “a” superscript are tobit regres-
sions, following Cameron and Trivedi (2005) suggestion of replacing zero with the lowest observed value minus a small amount. For these regressions, column 1 presents the estimated
mean for observations in the population with non-zero values, whereas the standard deviation represents the sample standard deviation (as some strata do not contain observations at
baseline STATA is not able to compute population standard deviations). ⁎ p b 0.1, ⁎⁎ p b 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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Since most share-outs are at the end of the year, when purchases of
seed and fertilizer are made, Table 9 investigates whether inputs into
and outputs of maize have changed. The ﬁrst column shows the weight-
ed baseline means, whereas columns 2 through 5 provide results for the
difference inmeans, difference-in-meanswith lag, thepooled difference-
in-differences and the ﬁrst difference regressions, respectively.
On the input side,we ﬁnd evidence that households in treatment vil-
lagesweremore likely to use fertilizer for growingmaize. On the output
side, we ﬁnd a positive effect on the likelihood that households in treat-
ment villages sold part of their maize production and that the totalvalue of maize sales increased. We do, however, not ﬁnd evidence
that production increased, nor of an increase in maize output. This evi-
dence does point to a change in agricultural practices. However, be-
cause this has not led to signiﬁcantly higher yields, this is unlikely to
be the primary channel for the observed increase in food security and
expenditures.32
Table 9
ITT effects on maize planting practice and outcomes.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outcome Baseline mean Difference in means Difference in means with lag Difference-in-difference First-difference
Household uses any fertilizer on maize 0.452 0.135⁎⁎ 0.127⁎⁎ 0.106⁎ 0.093⁎
[.498] (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Area with maize (acres) 1.375 −0.306⁎ −0.241 −0.120 −0.154
[.897] (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
Quantity of maize harvested (kg, log)a 5.759 −0.103 n.a. n.a. n.a.
[.925] (0.13) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Household sold any maize 0.202 0.095⁎ 0.116⁎⁎ 0.140⁎ 0.198⁎⁎⁎
[.402] (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06)
Value of agricultural sale (MK, log)a 9.375 −0.582 n.a. n.a. n.a.
[1.55] (0.56) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Value of maize sale (MK, log)a 7.936 1.489⁎⁎ n.a. n.a. n.a.
[.958] (0.73) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Notes: Table reports estimates of the impact of VSLA on agricultural inputs. Column (1) presents themean of the outcome at baseline, with standard deviations in square brackets. Column
(2) presents the results from the difference in means speciﬁcation, column (3) from the difference in means with lagged value speciﬁcation. Columns (4) and (5) present results from
difference-in-differences andﬁrst differences speciﬁcations, respectively. Rowswithout “a” superscript contain Least squares regressions. Regressionswith “a” superscript are tobit regres-
sions, following Cameron and Trivedi (2005) suggestion of replacing zero with the lowest observed value minus a small amount. For these regressions, column 1 presents the estimated
mean for observations in the population with non-zero values. ⁎ p b 0.01, ⁎⁎ p b 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
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Table 10 reports the estimated ITT effects on income derived from
business. This is deﬁned as the money earned (or lost) in the last
month of operation, i.e. it is a measure of proﬁt. Based on OLS regres-
sions, the ﬁrst panel shows that there is some weak evidence that the
average number of businesses in the treatment villages increased. Turn-
ing to the mean outcome, we see that business income increased by
about 6590 MWK (about the size of the share-out) on average (s.e. =
8926). However, due to the very large variation in business income,
the estimated standard errors are very large and the result is not statis-
tically signiﬁcant.Table 10
Effects on small business outcomes.
Outcome
OLS regressions
Number of businesses (excluding agriculture and livestock)
Total income from all businesses (MWK)
Quantile regressions
Business income all respondents
25th
50th (median)
75th
Business income respondents with business at baseline
25th
50th (median)
75th
Business income respondents without business at baseline
25th
50th (median)
75th
Notes: Table reports estimates of the impact of VSLA on income generating activities. Column 1
Columns 3 and 4 present results from difference in means and difference in means with lag, re
include stratiﬁcation dummies, as well as a dummy for baseline business activity. Quantile stan
questionnaire respondents.⁎ p b 0.1, ⁎⁎ p b 0.05.The results in the second panel are therefore based on quantile
regressions, giving us results robust to outliers and allowing us to inves-
tigate whether there are heterogeneous effects at different place in the
business income distribution. We ﬁnd that median income from busi-
ness has increased by between 1295 (s.e. = 758) and 1500 MWK
(s.e. = 904) more for the median treatment household than for the
median control household, an effect that is statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10% level. The treatment effect is higher than the median income
from business at baseline. We then investigate whether there are im-
pacts at the 25th and 75th percentiles and ﬁnd that we cannot reject
that there are no effects on average. We then investigate whether busi-
ness incomes rose for the 66% of households who had already beenBaseline mean Difference in means Difference in means with lag
0.93 0.192 0.241⁎
[0.778] (0.129) (0.125)
10523.2 6589.8 2453.4
[49834.1] (8926.315) (5609.115)
0
600 386.5
(463.3) (435.8)
700
1,500⁎ 1295⁎
(904.4) (758.3)
4000
1150 1652
(1747) (1559)
723
900 615.0
(730.2) (694.2)
2500
2500⁎ 2811⁎⁎
(1330) (1208)
6100
4600⁎ 3911⁎
(2407) (2069)
0
0 n.a.
(123.1)
0
0 n.a.
(1108)
0
−2400⁎ n.a.
(1421)
presents themean of the outcome at baseline, with standard deviations in square brackets.
spectively. OLS regressions follow speciﬁcations described in Table 5. Quantile regressions
dard errors are cluster-bootstrapped and include the randomization strata. Sample: long
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precisely estimated treatment effects, suggesting signiﬁcant positive
impacts on both the 50th and 75th percentiles. Conversely, for house-
holds who had not yet been engaged in some small-scale business,
there is no evidence that their business income increased for themedian
household.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the program seems to have led to
signiﬁcant increases in investments in agriculture, although we cannot
detect any impact on agricultural outcomes. On the other hand, the
VSLAs were more successful in increasing the income from existing
small-scale businesses.
4.9. Cost effectiveness
In order to assess whether VSLAs are worthwhile, this section
provides some simple cost-effectiveness calculations. We estimate the
cost per year of the implementation in the project studied as total
costs (USD 201,000) divided by three. The speciﬁc intervention investi-
gated was quite costly compared to the average VSLA intervention due
to its relatively small scale and the fact that VSLAs often use village
agents to a greater extent than the randomization allowed in the project
setup.33
The implementing partner reported having a total number of 1783
VSLA members by September 2011 out of the 3800 households in the
treatment villages. The cost per member was thus USD 75,34 while the
cost per household in a treatment village was USD 35 per year of
implementation.
The estimated effect on total household expenditures of 4.2 per cent
corresponds to an increase in the average household expenditures of
0.124 USD per household per day, which is equivalent to USD 0.31 at
PPP adjusted priced (PPP 2005). On this basis the project broke even
after 280 days or a bit over nine months of impact (based on the two-
year impact estimates).35 These estimates do not include impacts
beyond the duration of the two years or impacts on other measures
beyond the impact on household expenditures.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that improvements in local ﬁnancial
market intermediation can have a signiﬁcant impact on household
welfare and economic activities in remote rural areas of developing
countries. Village Savings and Loan Associations have been heavily pro-
moted in the hope of remedying what has been termed the “last mile
problem of microﬁnance”: operating a microﬁnance institution and
(evenmore so a bank) is rarely proﬁtable in remote rural areas in devel-
oping countries. VSLAs, on the other hand, do not rely on any outside
injection of funds or professional management once set up. They har-
ness savings in the local community which are re-invested locally, and
are entirely self-managed. A set of carefully thought-out safeguards
and governance features seem to be able to sustain the trust necessary
for an improved local ﬁnancial market intermediation. As household
wealth increases and VSLAs mature, it is possible that these semi-
formal institutions might even be integrated into the formal ﬁnancial
sector.
This paper provides evidence of the effects on household welfare of
introducing VSLAs in rural Malawi. We ﬁnd that this introduction raises
welfare along a number of dimensions, in particular for improved food33 Normally, VSLAs are introduced to a single village. Some VSLAmembers then become
village agents, who subsequently start VSLAs in neighboring villages. While this limits the
costs of the intervention, we do not know what the effects of relying on village agents
rather than trained ﬁeld ofﬁcers would be.
34 This is higher than the typical cost of implementing VSLAs as reported by Allen and
Panetta (2010), which was USD 18 to 48 per member.
35 The estimates are very close, when instead we use the treatment effect on meals per
day of 0.126 meals per day as a starting point.security and strengthened household income indicators. The results
provide evidence that households in the poorest, most rural areas are
constrained by lack of access to ﬁnancial institutions providing savings
and credit opportunities. Having analyzed the impact only two years
after the onset of the project, we ﬁnd these indications of the positive
effects of simply organizing savings groups which also create credit
opportunities for their members rather encouraging.
In studying how the money from share-outs and credit is used, we
ﬁnd that the use of fertilizer rises, and that loans are used primarily in
agriculture and small-scale businesses. Agricultural output increases in
response to the increased investments; however we cannot detect any
impact on agricultural outcomes. On the other hand, we do see an
increase in total business income among households, which already
had a business at baseline, whereas there was no signiﬁcant increase
in business income among households with newly established busi-
nesses. Judging by these results, the provision of opportunities for the
village to save and take out loans for agricultural and business invest-
mentsmay play a key role in travelling “the lastmile”.36 Themechanism
through which VSLAs might have impacts in different contexts might
well differ, given the different roles participants can play in these
savings groups. The mechanism we identify suggests the presence of
ﬁnancial market imperfections, whereas Beaman et al. (2014) suggest
that women in their treatment villages become more forward looking.
The above conclusions have limitations, however, which should be
kept inmind. Out of the 80,000VSLAs across theworld, we have studied
only a few. The results may be speciﬁc to the context, cultural and eco-
nomic, in which they appear, and the particular constraints faced by
households in these communities. Future assessments from other
places, including the ones we know are under way, will shed light on
the extent to which these ﬁndings can be generalized.
Appendix A. Protocol of intervention of NGO in the villages
Both the villages in the treatment and control group received the
same information, according to the ﬁeld reports from the implementing
agency. Two types of meetings were held, following the VSLA manual
from 2009.
1. One orientation of community leaders and administration ofﬁcials.
2. Introducing VSL to the community.
The ﬁrst meeting included Senior Chiefs, Group Village Headmen,
Village Headmen, religious leaders, various development committees
currently present in the project area as well as government workers.
The objective of this meeting was to obtain the support of key stake-
holders. The agenda was the following:
1. Introduction of the implementing organisation.
2. Project goals and objectives.
3. Target group to be served.
4. Services offered.
5. Role of local leaders and administrators.
6. The stakeholders were told about similar programs in nearby regions
(that had been successful).
The second set of meetings was carried out in each of the 46 villages.
The goal of these meetings was to create general awareness in the com-
munity of the programme's purpose, methodology and process and to
offer the opportunity to register for training. The purposeswere described
to be to enable villagers tomanage their own savings and to administrate
a loan facility through which they could earn a proﬁt. It was emphasized
that there would be no injection of funds into the saving groups other36 We do not know to what extent participation and savings in VSLAs are driven by the
commitment aspect of the associations—the obligation to contribute a minimum amount
each week. Duﬂo et al. (2011) suggest that in the Kenyan context, the inability to save for
investments is due to behavioral biases.
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Fig. A1. Change in number of rooms over time
83C. Ksoll et al. / Journal of Development Economics 120 (2016) 70–85than a cash kit, which would be issued out as a loan. All villages were
informed that 50 groups would be formed each year for three years and
not all villages could receive training in the ﬁrst year of implementation.
Rather a lottery draw would be conducted to ﬁnd which villages would
be included in the project between 2009 and 2011 and which would be
included after 2011. It was in these meetings that villagers could voice
their interest and put their names on the initial list of interested house-
holds. Following meetings in all 46 villages, the randomization was
carried out and an introductory meeting was held with groups in the 23
treatment villages.
Appendix B. Multiple hypothesis testing procedure
The usual p-values are underestimated when multiple hypotheses
are tested, and need to be adjusted so that the rejection rate is correct
under the null. To gain an intuition of how this works, take the case
where you are testing two variables, X and Y with p-values of 0.045
and 0.04. The standard Bonferroni correction would say that since you
are testing two variables, you have (almost) twice the probability of
ﬁnding at least one error at the 5% level of signiﬁcance, so you have to
“adjust” the p-values by a factor of 2. In this example, such an adjust-
ment would mean that the variables are not signiﬁcant at the 5% level
of signiﬁcance, even though both are individually signiﬁcant at that
level.
An alternative adjustment procedure is suggested by Benjamini
and Hochberg (1995). Their method proceeds as follows: it orders the
p-values from the lowest to highest. Deﬁne pi as the ith p-value in this
ordering. Then analyse whether pib i/m *α, where i is the ordering
parameter, m are the number of total hypotheses tested, and α the
level of signiﬁcance. If the inequality ismet for any variable, then all var-
iables with a lower p-value are considered signiﬁcant for signiﬁcance
level α. In the example of X and Y the inequality is not met for the
ﬁrst variable, but is true for the second variable, so both variables are
signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Benjamini et al. (2006), as explained in Anderson (2008), show how
to improve power further. They implement a two-stage procedure,
where the idea is as follows: the cut-off from the Benjamini and
Hochberg method mentioned above (whether pib i/m*α) assumes
that all null hypotheses are true. If say c of the ﬁrst variables issigniﬁcant at very, very high levels of signiﬁcance, we should take
that into account. This can be done as follows (see Anderson,
2008): Implement the Benjamini and Hochberg method with a signiﬁ-
cance level of α/(1+α). Deﬁne c as the number of rejected hypotheses.
Computem0 ¼ m c, which is an estimate of the number of incorrect hy-
potheses. Redo the Benjamini and Hochberg method with the following
cutoff: pibi=m0  α=ð1þ αÞ . Anderson (2008) then shows how to go
from rejection at speciﬁed levels of signiﬁcance to the lowest level of
signiﬁcance, at which the hypotheses can be rejected, these adjusted p-
values are denoted as sharpened q-values.
Table A1
VSLA interest and participation.(1)Dep var: VSLA membership Linear Probability Modelanel 1
Hs not on initial list of interested in control villages 0.113anel 2: Increase in participation over base category (HHs not on initial list of
interested in control villages)n interested list in control villages
0.152***
(0.0334)ot on interested list in treatment villages
0.241***
(0.0398)n interested list in treatment villages
0.491***
(0.0439)anel 3: Interaction between Interest and treatment (coefﬁcient and signiﬁcance)n interested list ∗ treatment village
0.098**
(0.0455)bservations 1680
-squared 0.107RNotes: Table reports estimates of probability of participation in VSLA using a Linear
Probability Model. Panel 1 presents the proportion of households not on the initial list of
interested households in the control villages who participate in VSLAs. This is the base
category. Panel 2 presents estimates of the increase in the participation probability for
the three categories: On interested list in control villages, not on interested list in treat-
ment villages, and on interested list in treatment villages. The estimated coefﬁcients are
also from a Linear Probability Model that includes block ﬁxed effects. Panel 3 presents
the estimate of whether the effect of being both interested and in a treatment village
(0.491) at the same time is different from the sum of the coefﬁcients of being interested
(0.152) and being treated (0.241). Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p b 0.01,
**p b 0.05, *p b 0.1.
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Time trend in savings in control villages.T
EE
O
able A3
ffects on other agric
Outcome
Household uses
any fertilizer
Household
cultivates
vegetable plot
Household has
any irrigated
plots
Household used
any purchased
seeds
Total area
cultivated
(acres)
Area with local
maize (acres)
Area with
composite
maize (acres)
Area with hybrid
maize (acres)
Area with
tobacco (acres)
Area with cotton
(acres)
Area with rice
(acres)
Local maize
harvested
(kg, log)a
Composite maize
harvested
(kg, log)a
Hybrid maize
harvested
(kg, log)a
Local maize
harvested per
acre (kg, log)a
Composite maize
harvested per
acre (kg, log)a
Hybrid maize
harvested per
any crops(1)ultural ou
(1)
Baseline
mean
0.702
[0.458]
0.247
[0.431]
0.28
[0.449]
0.803
[0.398]
2.876
[1.716]
0.53
[0.784]
0.079
[0.36]
0.766
[0.86]
0.184
[0.439]
0.315
[0.64]
0.316
[0.593]
5.397
[0.913]
5.911
[1.008]
5.668
[0.957]
5.35
[0.8]
5.741
[0.897]
5.639
[0.492](2)tputs.
(3) (2)
Difference
in means
Diff
in m
with
0.088 0.09
(0.06) (0.0
−0.047 −0
(0.03) (0.0
0.01 0.04
(0.05) (0.0
0.011 0.01
(0.05) (0.0
−0.251 −0
(0.19) (0.1
−0.309** −0
(0.15) (0.1
−0.009 −0
(0.01) (0.0
0.012 0.03
(0.08) (0.0
0.023 0.04
(0.06) (0.0
−0.022 −0
(0.06) (0.0
−0.18 −0
(0.13) (0.0
−0.920* n.a.
(0.53) n.a.
0.292 n.a.
(0.61) n.a.
0.33 n.a.
(0.28) n.a.
−0.816 n.a.
(0.50) n.a.
0.417 n.a.
(0.72) n.a.
0.374 n.a.
(0.06) (0.0(3)(4)
erence
eans
lag
Differen
differen
2 0.108
5) (0.08)
.023 0.037
3) (0.04)
7 0.125
5) (0.08)
7 0.054
5) (0.07)
.119 −0.013
6) (0.21)
.286* −0.183
5) (0.12)
.009 −0.022
1) (0.03)
4 0.084
8) (0.08)
3 0.06
5) (0.06)
.021 0.002
4) (0.07)
.098 −0.038
9) (0.11)
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
6) (0.08)(4)(5)
ce-in-
ce Firs
0.1
(0.0
0.0
(0.0
0.1
(0.0
0.07
(0.0
0.01
(0.2
−0
(0.1
−0
(0.0
0.09
(0.0
0.07
(0.0
−0
(0.0
−0
(0.1
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
(0.0(5)Dep var:
Log(savings + 1)Entire
control
groupControl
villages: on
list of
interested HHControl
villages: not
on list of
interested HHControl
group
VSLA
membersControl
group
non-VSLA
membersndline
0.795 1.317*** 0.687 2.906*** -0.038
(0.798) (0.409) (0.945) (0.577) (0.942)bservations 811 509 302 267 544
-squared 0.018 0.045 0.018 0.234 0.016RNotes: Table reports estimates of a regression of savings on a dummy for endline, as well
as block ﬁxed effects. Column 1 presents results for the entire sample of control group
members. Column 2 shows the estimate from a regression of savings on a dummy for
endline for HHs on the interested list. Column 3 present equivalent results for HHs not
on the interested list. Column 4 presents results for respondents who in either of the
two survey rounds were members of a VSLA. Column 5 presents results for respondents
who were never VSLA members. The dependent variable is different than in Table 5, as
implementing a tobit regression in the speciﬁcation of Table 5 results in an error, due to
one strata only containing a single village in the control group. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1.t-difference
7)
37
3)
66**
7)
3
8)
1)
.227*
3)
.02
2)
4
7)
1
6)
.022
6)
.015
1)
Notes: Table reports estimates of the impact of VSLA on agricultural inputs. Column
(1) presents the mean of the outcome at baseline, with standard deviations in square
brackets. Column (2) presents the results from the difference in means speciﬁcation,
column (3) from the difference in means with lagged value speciﬁcation. Columns
(4) and (5) present results from difference-in-differences and ﬁrst difference speciﬁ-
cations, respectively. Rows without “a” superscript contain Least squares regressions.
Regressions with “a” superscript are tobit regressions, following Cameron and Trivedi
(2005) suggestion of replacing zero with the lowest observed value minus a smallacre (kg, log)a
[0.837] (0.28) n.a. n.a. n.a.
Household sold 0.592 −0.041 −0.021 −0.016 0.027
7)Appendix C. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.12.003.
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